Detecting Jamming Using RTS CTS Strategy

Abstract

Time-critical wireless applications in rising network systems, like healthcare and sensible grids, are drawing
increasing attention in each business and academe. The printed nature of wireless channels inescapably exposes such
applications to electronic jamming attacks. However, existing strategies to characterize and notice electronic jamming
attacks cannot be applied on to time-critical networks whose communication traffic model differs from standard models.
In this paper we recommend a brand new category of anti-jamming issues wherever the kind of intelligence associated
with an electronic jamming attack is unknown. Specifically, we tend to take into account a problem wherever the nodes of
a peer-to-peer network don't grasp whether or not the network is under fire by a random sender (which may well be
thought of as a natural background noise), or associate degree intelligent one (i.e., the sender UN agency will adapt his
strategy supported data gained throughout attacks). The goal of the nodes is to identify the kind of the attack supported
data obtained from the attack in previous time slots, and thereby to cut back the potency of the electronic jamming
attack. First we tend to model the matter as a theorem game for one slot attack, and reduce it to the answer of twin
applied math (LP) issues.